Life on the road was anything but glamorous for Farm Security Administration photographers traveling through southern Illinois in the mid-1930s. Often their most promising subjects lived at the end of the worst roads, many of which lacked bridges, drainage ditches, or gravel. Outfitted with three government-issue cameras, flashbulbs, tripods, and film-processing chemicals, their job was to help explain America to Americans by seeking out and photographing the one-third of the nation FDR described as ill-housed, ill-clad, and ill-nourished. Featured in this (...) book are more than one hundred photographs from the collection of a quarter of a million taken by FSA photographers between 1935 and 1943. These pictures capture life during the Great Depression as viewed in the coal-mining towns of Herrin, West Frankfort, and Zeigler; the river communities of Shawneetown, Cairo, and Grayville; the farming regions near McLeansboro, Newton, and Harrisburg--more than two dozen southern Illinois county seats, hamlets, and landings. Together they comprise a photographic portrait of the determination, hard work, and capacity to find ways to celebrate life exemplified by the people of southern Illinois during one of the most difficult periods of American history. FSA photographers helped to invent and popularize the documentary style, a type of photography in which pictures and their arrangement carry much of the information in a story. Intended to document the success of a government project, these pictures survived to preserve for later generations the story of the people of southern Illinois and how they endured the difficult times of the Great Depression. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

In The State of Southern Illinois: An Illustrated History, Herbert K. Russell offers fresh interpretations of a number of important aspects of Southern Illinois history. Focusing on the area known as “Egypt,” the region south of U.S. Route 50 from Salem south to Cairo, he begins his book with the earliest geologic formations and follows Southern Illinois’s history into the twenty-first century. The volume is richly illustrated with maps and photographs, mostly in color, that highlight the informative and (...) straightforward text. Perhaps most notable is the author’s use of dozens of heretofore neglected sources to dispel the myth that Southern Illinois is merely an extension of Dixie. He corrects the popular impressions that slavery was introduced by early settlers from the South and that a majority of Southern Illinoisans wished to secede. Furthermore, he presents the first in-depth discussion of twelve pre–Civil War, free black communities located in the region. He also identifies the roles coal mining, labor violence, gangsters, and the media played in establishing the area’s image. He concludes optimistically, unveiling a twenty-first-century Southern Illinois filled with myriad attractions and opportunities for citizens and tourists alike. The State of Southern Illinois is the most accurate all-encompassing volume of history on this unique area that often regards itself as a state within a state. It offers an entirely new perspective on race relations, provides insightful information on the cultural divide between north and south in Illinois, and pays tribute to an often neglected and misunderstood region of this multidimensional state, all against a stunning visual backdrop. Superior Achievement from the Illinois State Historical Society, 2013. (shrink)

Bertrand Russell’s eminence of intellect and person has long been unassailable. Besides his distinction as mathematician and philosopher, and a vast output of books, articles, lectures and talks on most aspects of the human condition, there is his continuing concern for day-to-day political issues, his championing of individual freedom and his readiness to stand for a cause to the point of imprisonment. To have distilled the essence of his ninety-odd years into this little book is itself quite an achievement. (...) Originally published in 1962, it has been called a ‘pocket guide to greatness’ and forms a useful complement to the longer and slightly earlier study by Alan Wood’s _The Passionate Sceptic. _. (shrink)

It is argued that Strawson's celebrated attacks on Russell's views about proper names and descriptions are misleading and unfounded. An attempt is made to show that Strawson's alternative views are philosophically more problematic than Russell's. It is also argued that, properly stated, Russell's analyses do not do violence to ordinary usage and that attempts to justify Strawson's analysis on the ground that it fits better with ordinary usage are mistaken.

Bertrand Russell’s eminence of intellect and person has long been unassailable. Besides his distinction as mathematician and philosopher, and a vast output of books, articles, lectures and talks on most aspects of the human condition, there is his continuing concern for day-to-day political issues, his championing of individual freedom and his readiness to stand for a cause to the point of imprisonment. To have distilled the essence of his ninety-odd years into this little book is itself quite an achievement. (...) Originally published in 1962, it has been called a ‘pocket guide to greatness’ and forms a useful complement to the longer and slightly earlier study by Alan Wood’s The Passionate Sceptic. (shrink)

Russell’s late ontology sought to avoid “wholly colourless particulars” (substrata, points of space, bare instants of time) by appealing to complexes of compresent qualities in place of particulars that exemplify qualitieso Yet he insisted on (i) calling qualities like redness “discontinuous,” “repeatable” particulars, and (ii) claiming that such qualities were not universals, since they were not exemplified but were ultimate subjects that exemplified universal relations and universal qualities. It is argued that his choice of terminology is not only misleading, (...) but is ironically not consistent with the concept of universality implicit in his well known “proof” of the existence of universals, a proof he retained in his later (1940-48) ontology. It is also argued that there are substantive grounds for rejecting his classification that clarify the concept of a universal. (shrink)

The author addresses the question as to whether russell and whitehead "provide an explication of the idea that arithmetical truths are tautologies." he thinks their achievement was in developing an axiomatic system in which the "interpreted propositions are tautologies," but not in proving this of mathematics. He thinks the real problem here is the attempt to explicate ordinary language via formally constructed languages. (staff).

Russell’s late ontology sought to avoid “wholly colourless particulars” (substrata, points of space, bare instants of time) by appealing to complexes of compresent qualities in place of particulars that exemplify qualitieso Yet he insisted on (i) calling qualities like redness “discontinuous,” “repeatable” particulars, and (ii) claiming that such qualities were not universals, since they were not exemplified but were ultimate subjects that exemplified universal relations and universal qualities. It is argued that his choice of terminology is not only misleading, (...) but is ironically not consistent with the concept of universality implicit in his well known “proof” of the existence of universals, a proof he retained in his later (1940-48) ontology. It is also argued that there are substantive grounds for rejecting his classification that clarify the concept of a universal. (shrink)

In the years spanning the first half of the 20th century Bertrand Russell wavered between two incompatible accounts of physical reality. On one account, physical objects were taken to be logical constructs of phenomenal entities, the immediate data of sense experience. Such a view roughly fits the familiar characterization of being a combination of “Hume plus mathematical logic.” This type of phenomenalism, in the empiricist tradition, contrasted starkly with a variant of scientific realism, including a realistic account of causal (...) connections as relations between universals, that Russell developed between 1912 and 1927, and which was derived from Kant’s distinction between a noumenal and a phenomenal world. My concern in this paper is with the viability of the unique form of scientific realism Russell developed, the role of universals and causal explanation in it, and criticisms that have been directed at it. I will argue that an early refutation of Russell’s realism by the mathematician M. Newman and a recent revival of that refutation by W. Demopoulos and M. Friedman ignore the critical role universals play in Russell’s scientific realism and hence fail to refute his view. I will also briefly consider a recent “anti-realist” argument that repeats Newman’s mistake: interpreting predicates in terms of extensions and not as referring to universal properties and relations. (shrink)

In the years spanning the first half of the 20th century Bertrand Russell wavered between two incompatible accounts of physical reality. On one account, physical objects were taken to be logical constructs of phenomenal entities, the immediate data of sense experience. Such a view roughly fits the familiar characterization of being a combination of “Hume plus mathematical logic.” This type of phenomenalism, in the empiricist tradition, contrasted starkly with a variant of scientific realism, including a realistic account of causal (...) connections as relations between universals, that Russell developed between 1912 and 1927, and which was derived from Kant’s distinction between a noumenal and a phenomenal world. My concern in this paper is with the viability of the unique form of scientific realism Russell developed, the role of universals and causal explanation in it, and criticisms that have been directed at it. I will argue that an early refutation of Russell’s realism by the mathematician M. Newman and a recent revival of that refutation by W. Demopoulos and M. Friedman ignore the critical role universals play in Russell’s scientific realism and hence fail to refute his view. I will also briefly consider a recent “anti-realist” argument that repeats Newman’s mistake: interpreting predicates in terms of extensions and not as referring to universal properties and relations. (shrink)

In an often cited paper, “Universals,” Ramsey attacked the classical distinction between universals and particulars and a 20th century version of it that Russell had set forth. Russell, early in that century, had depended on a questionable distinction taken from Frege—between universals being “incomplete” and particulars being “complete.” This was in part due, as it was for Frege, to an attempt to avoid Bradley-type regresses and account for the “unity” of propositions . But Ramsey’s forceful line of argument, (...) taking Russell’s distinction to depend on projecting linguistic or “logical” distinctions onto “the world,” makes clear use of the predicable-subject distinction that is more basic and which he is also challenging. The discussion of Ramsey’s attack on Russell’s distinctions and of Russell’s reply in a later review, as well as of the ontological import of their controversy and its contemporary revival, leads to consideration of ontological problems in connection with atomic facts and classes and the distinction between simple and complex entities. (shrink)

The life of the Buddha. Patricia M. Herbert. The British Library, London 1993. 95 pp. £12.95.

Russell's 1913 manuscript Theory of Knowledge was not published until 1984. He supposedly abandoned the main part of the manuscript, while publishing the first six chapters as articles in The Monist, due to Wittgenstein's criticisms of his “multiple relation” analysis of belief. There have been numerous unsuccessful and erroneous attempts to interpret the manuscript, including those of D. Pears and G. Landini. The paper explores the Russell‐Wittgenstein “controversy” and shows the radical way Russell altered his earlier versions (...) of his analysis of belief and the connections the changes had to his new, and very important, analyses of relational order, of truth as correspondence, and of propositions. Russell's analysis of relational order reveals the first recognition by a correspondence theorist of a fundamental problem the correspondence theory faces as well as a long overlooked and unappreciated application Russell made of his theory of definite descriptions. (shrink)

The paper begins by considering Russell's criticism of Meinong's theory of objects and Sosein that center on the notions of negation and existence. The discussion raises issues about functions, properties, predication, the "concept" of existence and relations. These lead to a consideration of recent revivals of moderate nominalism in the form of trope theories. An argument against such theories suggests a fundamental principle of ontology and a reformulation of the nominalism-realism dispute.

The paper begins by considering Russell's criticism of Meinong's theory of objects and Sosein that center on the notions of negation and existence. The discussion raises issues about functions, properties, predication, the "concept" of existence and relations. These lead to a consideration of recent revivals of moderate nominalism in the form of trope theories. An argument against such theories suggests a fundamental principle of ontology and a reformulation of the nominalism-realism dispute.

The book contains the first systematic study of the ontology and metaphysics of Gustav Bergmann, tracing their development from early (1940s) criticisms of Carnap’s semantical theories in Introduction to Semantics, to their culmination in his 1992 _New Foundations of Ontology_. This involves a detailed study of the implicit metaphysical doctrines in Carnap’s important, but long neglected, 1942 book and their connection to his influential views on reference, truth and modality, (including, contrary to current opinion, Carnap’s initiating the development of predicate (...) modal logic) that culminated in _Meaning and Necessity_. In dealing with various fundamental issues in ontology and metaphysics, the book discusses relevant views of major philosophers, such as Russell, Moore, Bradley, Wittgenstein, Meinong, Brentano, Husserl, Broad, McTaggart, and Quine, and of contemporary and recent figures, including D. M. Armstrong, D. Lewis, S. Kripke, J. Searle, W. Sellars, D. Davidson, J. J. C. Smart, and H. Feigl. Building on the critical studies of Bergmann, Carnap and such other philosophers, the author argues for a form of Logical Realism derived from important, but long misunderstood and ignored, aspects of Russell’s theories of descriptions, reference and truth. (shrink)

Russell’s elimination of basic particulars, in An lnquiry into Meaning and Truth and Human Knowledge: lts Scope and Limits, by purportedly construing them as “bundles” or “complexes” of universal qualities has been attacked over the years by A. J. Ayer, M. Black, D. M. Armstrong, M. Loux, and others. These criticisms of Russell’s ontological assay of “particularity” have been based on misconstruals of his analysis. The present paper interprets Russell’s analysis, rebuts arguments of his critics, and sets (...) out a different criticism of “bundle” analyses of particulars of the Russellian kind. (shrink)

Thought, Fact, and Reference was first published in 1978.Against a background of criticism of alternative accounts, Professor Hochberg presents an analysis of thought, reference, and truth within the tradition of logical atomism. He analyzes G. E. Moore's early attack on idealism and examines the influence of Moore on the development of Bertrand Russell's and Ludwig Wittgenstein's logical atomism. He traces an early divergence between Russell and Wittgenstein, on the one side, and Moore and Gottlob Frege on the other, (...) into variants recently advocated by Wilfrid Sellars, Gustav Bergmann, and others. The work will be of interest to professional philosophers, graduate students in philosophy, and linguists with interests in philosophy. (shrink)

The philosophical analysis that grew up in Cambridge under the leadership of Whitehead, russel and Moore, the sophisticated, modernized versions of Catholic ...

The paper sets out a version of a correspondence theory of truth that deals with a number of problems such theories traditionally face, problems associated with the names of Bradley, Meinong, Camap, Russell, Wittgenstein and Moore and that arise in connection with attempts to analyze facts of various logical forms. The line of argument employs a somewhat novel application of Russell's theory of definite descriptions. In developing a form of "logical realism" the paper takes up various ontological issues (...) regarding classes, causal laws, modality, predication, negation and relations. It does so in connection with critical discussions of alternative views recently proposed by Armstrong, Bergmann, Lewis and Putnam. (shrink)

The article considers, in a historical setting, the links between varieties of nominalism—the extreme nominalism of the Quine-Goodman variety and the trope nominalism current today—and types of idealism. In so doing arguments of various twentieth century figures, including Husserl, Bradley, Russell, and Sartre, as well as a contemporary attack on relations by Peter Simons are critically examined. The paper seeks to link the rejection of realism about universals with the rejection of a mind-independent “world”—in short, linking nominalism with idealism.

Russell’s elimination of basic particulars, in An lnquiry into Meaning and Truth and Human Knowledge: lts Scope and Limits, by purportedly construing them as “bundles” or “complexes” of universal qualities has been attacked over the years by A. J. Ayer, M. Black, D. M. Armstrong, M. Loux, and others. These criticisms of Russell’s ontological assay of “particularity” have been based on misconstruals of his analysis. The present paper interprets Russell’s analysis, rebuts arguments of his critics, and sets (...) out a different criticism of “bundle” analyses of particulars of the Russellian kind. (shrink)

Two connected themes have been at the core of the old perplexity regarding thinking and speaking about non-existent objects. One involves a question of reference. Can we refer to non-existent objects without, thereby, recognizing, in some sense, non-existent entities as objects of reference? The other involves a question about existence. Is existence a property representable by a predicate in a logically adequate symbohsm? It is argued (1) that existence is not to be construed as an attribute represented by a predicate, (...) (2) that nonnaming names introduce problems, not solutions to problems, (3) that purported properties such as self-identical are specious, and (4) that the Russell property is also seen to be specious by our consideration of predication. (shrink)

The development of the systematic ontology of Bergmannes posthumous 1992 work New Foundations of Ontology from its roots in his early criticisms of R. Camap's work on semantics to his acceptance of fundamental Meinongian ideas, is traced, critically examined and compared to views of others, such as G.E. Moore, B. Russell, W.V. Quine, and J. Searle. The discussion, focusing on main themes of his final metaphysical system, deals with problems posed by universals and particulars, predication and the Bradley "paradox", (...) facts, truth, intentionality and non-existent objectives, classes and the membership relation, logic and the analytic-synthetic distinction, arithmetic and logicism, ontological categories and canons, modalities, internal relations, and the question of the phenomenological ground of ontological claims. Some of the critical analyses are developed into alternative analyses. (shrink)

The development of the systematic ontology of Bergmannes posthumous 1992 work New Foundations of Ontology from its roots in his early criticisms of R. Camap's work on semantics to his acceptance of fundamental Meinongian ideas, is traced, critically examined and compared to views of others, such as G.E. Moore, B. Russell, W.V. Quine, and J. Searle. The discussion, focusing on main themes of his final metaphysical system, deals with problems posed by universals and particulars, predication and the Bradley "paradox", (...) facts, truth, intentionality and non-existent objectives, classes and the membership relation, logic and the analytic-synthetic distinction, arithmetic and logicism, ontological categories and canons, modalities, internal relations, and the question of the phenomenological ground of ontological claims. Some of the critical analyses are developed into alternative analyses. (shrink)